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Abstract 
Many of the countries hosting a peacebuilding mission have resumed to violence 
after the international community has left. The reason for this has often been a too 
quick liberalization creating pathologies that might lead to renewed conflict 
causing peacebuilding to fail. Therefore, an alternative model, focusing on insti-
tutionalization before liberalization (IBL), has been suggested. If this theory is 
true, IBL would be a more efficient way of reaching the goal of a liberal 
democracy by avoiding the pathologies that a too quick liberalization creates. By 
comparing the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, representing 
the quick liberalization model, and United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor, representing the IBL model, the question of institutionalization 
increasing the prospects of peacebuilding missions succeeding is answered. Using 
four parameters, the presence of violence, the elections, the human rights and the 
level of economy and development I find that the IBL model indeed has left 
Timor-Leste closer to a liberal democracy than Cambodia. The IBL model is not 
without problems though. There is a risk of leaving the local population outside 
the process of peacebuilding which might lead to renewed failures.   
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1 Introduction 
There is a high risk for post-conflict states to resume to violence, even if there has 
been some sort of peace operation present. The international community has thus 
not had an efficient strategy for creating a stable and lasting peace when 
deploying an operation. Therefore, in late 2005 the United Nations (UN) launched 
a new institution within its organization, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) 
which was the first organization established both by the Security Council and the 
General Assembly (A/RES/60/180, S/RES/1645). One of its tasks was to “advise 
on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery” 
(S/RES/1645 Para. 2a). While attending the meetings of the PBC, specifically its 
country specific meetings concerning Sierra Leone, during the fall of 2006 I came 
to realize that there seemed to be no consensus about what exactly it was that the 
PBC should do. What were the strategies and what should the PBC involve itself 
in? What was necessary for creating a stable and lasting peace? This, along with 
the notion that many of the previous peacebuilding operations had been failures, 
made me become interested in what approach is necessary for a peacebuilding 
mission to succeed.    
1.1 Statement of Purpose 
Peacekeeping operations have always been a part of the UN system. The 
operations have over the time, especially since the end of the Cold War, increased 
and changed their scope. Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced in 1992, in his report 
An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, 
the notion of peacebuilding which since the 1990s has been the focus for many 
UN operations. It is also within this area that this thesis takes its starting-point. 
More specifically the focus will be on how peacebuilding can become more 
successful. As I have mentioned, the presence of a stable peace and democracy 
can be questioned in many of the states where a peacebuilding mission has taken 
place. Why are there so many failures and is there a strategy that would increase 
the possibility for the operations succeeding?  
Roland Paris argues that a greater focus on institutionalization would be a 
more appropriate way of conducting peacebuilding to increase the prospects for 
success (2004). If he is right, an operation focusing on institutionalization before 
liberalization would be a greater success than one who does not. Since this is an 
approach that distinguishes itself from how most peacebuilding operations have 
been pursued in reality it would be of interest to investigate how well institution-
alization actually works. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to test Paris’ Insti-
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tutionalization Before Liberalization (IBL) theory. More specifically the question 
to be answered is: 
 
Does a focus on institutionalization increase the prospects of peacebuilding 
missions succeeding? 
 
Before going into the theory and methodology in depth peacebuilding will be 
defined and the disposition of this thesis will be presented.   
1.2 Definition of Peacebuilding 
The first step in identifying peacebuilding is to distinguish it from other types of 
peace operations. I will here clarify that the focus is on third party peacebuilding 
efforts (many times in cooperation with the host state) as opposed to efforts 
undertaken by the state of concern itself.  
     Boutros Boutros-Ghali divides conflict management into four categories: 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Peace-
building is identified as “rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations 
torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among 
nations formerly at war” (1992). This can be compared to the definition of the 
more traditional peacekeeping operation which is defined as “to work to preserve 
peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in imple-
menting agreements achieved by the peacemakers” (Ibid.). Also Tom Keating and 
Andy Knight mean that peacebuilding is “a means by which the outside world can 
contribute to the resolution of intrastate (or societal) conflict and to the recon-
struction, or construction, of a culture of peace in postconflict situations.” (2004 
p.xxxi). Paris uses the same categories as Boutros-Ghali but his definition is an 
“action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a 
recurrence of fighting.” (2002 p.38).  It should be mentioned here that some uses 
peacekeeping with the prefix second generation or multi-dimensional instead of 
peacebuilding to distinguish it from the more traditional peacekeeping operations 
(see i.e. Doyle and Sambanis 2000, Mason and Quinn 2006).  
     Some common themes are possible to distinguish here. Peacebuilding takes 
place at the end of an intrastate conflict and it aims at creating a stable peace and 
rebuilding a society. Peace and reconstruction are thus the keywords and the 
definition that will be used here. The reconstruction of a society can mean many 
things though, depending on what it is that should be reconstructed. This is of 
course ultimately defined by the over all goal of the peacebuilding mission. As 
will be shown, this goal has mainly been the same: to create a liberal democracy. 
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1.2.1 Peacebuilding and the Creation of a Liberal Democracy 
In the research done on peacebuilding there are some common reappearing themes 
when it comes to rebuilding the society. There is for example a focus on 
democratization through the preparation and monitoring of elections (Boutros- 
Ghali 1992, Keating and Knight 2004 p.xxxiii, Mason and Quinn p.26). The 
promotion of the rule of law and the protection of the human rights are also 
important aspects (see i.e. Boutros-Ghali 1992, Keating and Knight 2004 p.xxxiii, 
Mullenbach 2006 p.57, Rotberg 2002 p.33). Economy is a third area that can be 
distinguished. Robert Rotberg writes for example about the importance of “jump-
starting battered economies” (2002 p.33, compare Mullenbach 2006 p.57). As 
Michael Barnett puts it: “The explicit goal of many of these operations is to create 
a state defined by the rule of law, markets, and democracy.” (2006 p.88). 
Elections, rule of law, human rights and a working economy are, together with a 
stable peace, all features of the modern western liberal democracy. Thus peace-
building defined as creating a stable peace and rebuilding the society, in the long 
run means the creation of a liberal democracy. This is, according to Oliver 
Richmond, the common peacebuilding consensus (2004 pp.131-132). Therefore, 
the ultimate goal of peacebuilding can be defined as the liberal democracy. The 
reason for this is the liberal peace thesis: “the notion that democratic forms of 
government are more peaceful- both in their internal politics and in their inter-
national relations- than other forms of government.” (Paris 2004 p.41). The liberal 
peace thesis is well accepted today and important to understand what peace-
building in practice actually strives for. 
1.3 Disposition 
The disposition of this thesis will be as follows. Chapter two is the theory and 
methodology chapter. Here why peacebuilding missions so many times have been 
failures is presented. Thereafter the IBL model is explained. There is also a short 
introduction to the cases and the parameters that are used to make the comparison. 
In Chapter three the two cases, Cambodia and Timor-Leste are presented. This is 
done by giving a short introduction to the conflicts and the look at the mandate 
and the work of the two UN operations as to justify why they represent the two 
different models of peacebuilding. In chapter four the two countries are compared 
to decide which one come closest to the ideal of a liberal democracy. This is done 
by using four different parameters; the presence of violence, the elections, the 
human rights and the level of economy and development. Thus this chapter aims 
at showing if institutionalization increases the prospect for success. In the fifth 
and final chapter problems with the IBL are discussed. 
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2 Theory and Methodology 
Several studies have been done to evaluate previous peacebuilding missions. 
Mark Mullenbach for example compares states that have had a mission with those 
who have not. In his study he finds that out of the 15 cases that have had a 
peacebuilding mission 20% did resume to violence after five years. Of the 15 
cases that did not have a mission the number was 46.6% (2006 p.65). Michael 
Doyle’s and Nicholas Sambani’s study, which according to them is based on all 
civil wars since 1944 where a peacebuilding mission was present, shows that after 
two years 57.26% of the peacebuilding missions have failed and thus only 42.74% 
were successes when it comes to ending the hostilities (2000 p.783). When also 
requiring a minimum level of democratization, Doyle’s and Sambanis’ research 
gives a 65.32% failure rate and a 34.68% success rate (Ibid.). George Downs’ and 
Stephen Stedman’s success rate is somewhat higher. Out of sixteen cases six were 
successful, four were partially successful, and four were failures (2002 p.59). 
Paris on the other hand studies eleven cases during the 1990s and finds that only 
two of them were clear successes (2004 p.154). By combining these findings the 
result shows that the presence of a peacebuilding operation more often results in a 
success than when a mission is not present. Nevertheless, the failure rate for 
peacebuilding is quite high and this is a problem. 
The over all assessment of peacebuilding operations does not give a positive 
view. If one assumes that the liberal peace thesis is correct, the goal of a liberal 
democracy as to create stable peace and democracy is the right one. Therefore, the 
high failure rate should be connected to the method used to reach that goal rather 
than to the goal itself. What that method is and how it causes failures will know 
be presented. 
2.1 Quick Liberalization is Causing the Failures 
As mentioned before the main goal for peacebuilding has been to create a liberal 
democracy. Several researchers argue that the liberalization is done too quickly 
and therefore might be harmful rather than good (see i.e. Barnett 2006, Paris 
2004). The reason for this is that post-conflict states often do not have the 
necessary institutions to handle the processes of liberalization (Barnett 2006 p.89, 
Paris 2004 p. 152).  
The central question for Paris is whether liberalization, which is done through 
democratization and marketization, “fostered conditions for a stable and lasting 
peace in the states that hosted peacebuilding missions.” (2004 p.59). By examin-
ing eleven countries where a peacebuilding mission was present during the 1990s, 
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Paris finds that the process of political and economical liberalization, together or 
separately, in most cases “produced destabilizing side effects that worked against 
the consolidation of peace.” (2004 p.151). This might cause violence to resume. 
He continues his argument by saying that the low success rate is a result of a too 
quick liberalization creating pathologies that threatens the process of liberalization 
altogether and thus also the peace. Elections can for example be a focal point for 
harmful competition. It might cause polarization which then affects the process of 
democratization in a negative way. Ultimately it might lead to renewed violence 
as was the case in for example Angola and Rwanda. There might also be a pro-
blem with saboteurs and a failed transition. This occurs when newly elected 
leaders use the system that got them elected to halt the democratization. Examples 
of this are Liberia and Cambodia. There is also a risk of widening the gap between 
the rich and the poor by a too fast economic liberalization, which seems to have 
happened in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. Liberalization might also 
give space to civil society organizations that rejects the principle of toleration, an 
obvious example being Rwanda. Finally there is a risk for ethnic entrepreneurs 
who use the distrust between different groups in the society to build a political 
platform, for example former Yugoslavia (Ibid. pp.159-166). All this might be the 
result of trying to transform a country into a liberal market democracy during a 
period when the state is very fragile. What is needed to be able to deal with these 
pathologies are well functioning institutions (Ibid. p.174).   
Paris’ findings show that the method used to reach the goal of a stable peace 
through a liberal democracy has failed by focusing too much on a quick 
liberalization. After all, it took several decades for the Western states to become 
liberal democracies. Nevertheless, the international community often has 
conducted peacebuilding operations in a short amount of time focusing on 
democratization through elections and economic reforms. Thus my assumption 
will be that Paris’ findings are correct and by accepting that also implying that 
there is a need for a new strategy.  
2.2 Institutionalization Before Liberalization 
As an alternative to the quick liberalization model Paris introduces a new tech-
nique for conducting peacebuilding: Institutionalization Before Liberalization. 
This technique involves “constructing the foundations of effective political and 
economic institutions before the introduction of electoral democracy and market-
oriented adjustment policies” (Paris 2004 p.179). This is done because what is 
needed, according to Paris, in the immediate post-conflict period is “political 
stability and the establishment of effective administration over the territory” (Paris 
2004 p.187).   
The IBL peacebuilding strategy includes several different elements. First of all 
the conditions have to be ripe for holding elections. This includes political parties 
not contesting the elections and that governmental institutions that can resolve 
election disputes and enforce its outcome are in place (Ibid. p.189)
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electoral system should be designed as to reward moderation, which has to be 
decided within the specific context of each country (Ibid. p.194). Thirdly, a civil 
society that is conducive to peaceful democratic politics should be promoted at the 
same time as civil society organizations that does not have these values should be 
restrained (Ibid.). Fourthly, hate speech needs to be controlled. Finally, adoptions 
of conflict-reducing economic policies are necessary. This could be done by 
delaying the economic reforms until the political conditions have stabilized or by 
implementing the reforms over a longer period of time (Ibid. p.200). The common 
denominator for all these features is to rebuild effective state institutions. To 
clarify what Paris means by institutions it might be useful to quote him at some 
length: 
 
“These [institutional] elements include a constitutional court to 
resolve disputes surrounding elections and to uphold the articles 
of the constitution against challenges; a reliable police force to 
maintain domestic order and enforce the rulings of the 
constitutional court and any other court legally constituted under 
the constitution: a procedure for regulating hate speech in the 
media; a system of overseeing the conduct of political parties and 
civil-society organizations; electoral rules specifically designed 
to reward moderation; a legal framework capable of regulating 
the market economy; and a redistributive mechanism to protect 
the welfare of the most vulnerable sectors of the population.” 
(Ibid. p.205) 
 
The goal is still the liberal democracy but the method to reach that goal has 
changed to avoid the pathologies of too quick liberalization. A peacebuilding 
mission adopting the techniques of IBL should, if Paris theory is correct, thus be 
more successful at reaching and maintaining the goal of a liberal democracy than 
the ones who does not. 
2.3 Methodology 
As mentioned earlier this thesis aims at testing Paris’ idea of Institutionalization 
Before Liberalization. If Paris’ theory works a mission that adopts IBL, or at least 
some of its elements, would be more successful than a mission that does not. Two 
cases, one for each model needs to be compared to answer the question of 
institutionalization increasing the prospect of peacebuilding missions succeeding. 
The two cases that will be used here are the UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC), which will represent the liberalization model, and the UN 
  7 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)1, which will represent the 
IBL model. If Paris’ theory is true then Timor- Leste should be closer to the ideal 
of a liberal democracy than Cambodia. A problem occurring when using these 
cases is the time difference. Cambodia has had a longer post-conflict period than 
Timor-Leste and this must be taken into account when looking at the present 
situation. 
UNTAC was the first operation where the UN launched its “first full-scale 
post-Cold War nation-building operation.” (Dobbins et al 2005 p.70). In reality, as 
we shall see, the focus became the elections. Both the Paris Agreement and the 
Security Council resolution that gave UNTAC its mandate explicitly talked about 
the organization of elections. The Security Council resolution even gave a final 
date for when the elections were to be hold (S/RES/745).  Thus the quick fix 
liberalization method was used. UNTAET was also a first of its kind. It was the 
first operation where the UN actually took over a country and became the govern-
ment (Economist 2001). To be able to administer the state UNTAET had to build 
all the institutions necessary to govern a country. This was done by building up 
the civil administration, a police force and an army among other things. Thus it 
exemplifies the institutionalization model. The operations will be presented and 
discussed in further detail in the next coming chapter. 
2.3.1 Points of Comparison 
Since both model’s ultimate goal is to create a stable peace through a liberal 
democracy the success of the missions will be judged by comparing how well the 
operations have created favorable conditions for this in the respective countries. 
The state that comes closest to the ideal of a liberal democracy is the state with the 
type of operation that works the best. To evaluate this there will be several points 
of comparison. First of all I will look at the presence of violence since this is a 
sign of peace and also to some extent the rule of law. The higher level of violence 
the further away the state is from a liberal democracy. The second parameter will 
be the elections, freer and fairer elections signify a more democratic state. Thirdly 
in a liberal democracy the citizens have certain rights and freedoms. How the 
countries comply with the human rights will therefore be compared. More 
breaches means less democratic. This too will give implications for the rule of 
law. A part of the liberal democracy is also often the market economy and thus the 
level of economy and development will be the fourth and final point of compare-
ison.  
It can off course be questioned if these points of comparison are justifiable for 
looking at the success of a specific peacebuilding operation since they are very 
broad goals while a mission might have a very restricted mandate. Here it is not 
how well the operations have carried out there mandates that is of interest though. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 East Timor’s official name since the independence is Timor-Leste and this name will thus be used from now 
on, the exception being if East Timor is used in a mission’s name. 
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The mandates are different since they represent the different models. Instead it is 
the present situation in the countries respectively that will tell us something about 
how well the different operations and models actually are working. Another 
criticism could be that these are all Western measures of success. Measures that 
are more adjusted to the local setting might be useful. However, success is here 
defined as reaching the goal of a liberal democracy and therefore what constitutes 
this goal has to be the points of comparison. Nevertheless, there is an obvious 
problem with these parameters since they do not include how the populations of 
the countries respectively apprehend the operations and the present situation. The 
practical problem of not being able to interview the citizens circumscribes this 
possibility.  
2.3.2 Material 
The comparison will be done by mainly looking at statistics and reports from 
Amnesty International, Freedom House, the UN, the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) and the World Bank. There is a methodological problem with 
this because these are all second hand sources. There will be no first hand material 
which of course might affect the result. There might also be a problem with 
achieving reliable statistics from Cambodia and Timor-Leste. Using the UN and 
the World Bank might also cause a problem because they are sometimes evalu-
ating their own work. It is a possibility that the presentation of their work done in 
Cambodia and Timor-Leste is described in a too positive way. On the other hand 
the information I will use comes from well known and well recognized organi-
zations and their material is widely used to make comparisons. Thus the material 
should be credible enough to make conclusions.  
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3 Introduction to the Cases 
Before comparing Cambodia and Timor-Leste with each other the background to 
the conflicts will be presented. To show how UNTAC and UNTAET represent the 
different models the mandates and the work of the missions also are important. 
3.1 Cambodia 
Cambodia became a French protectorate in 1863. When the French were 
weakened during the World War II King Sihanouk started the independence 
negotiations and by 1953 Cambodia became independent (Brown and Zasloff 
1998 p.2). In 1970, due to the U.S. – Vietnam War, Sihanouk was voted out of 
office by the National Assembly and replaced by a pro-American regime 
(Chandler 1996 p.191). The new regime, lead by general Lon Nol, launched two 
failed offensives against the Vietnamese but managed, mostly because of military 
assistance from the U.S., to stay in power for four years. By 1975 the Khmer 
Rouge, the Cambodian communist guerilla, managed to take the power and 
imposed a totalitarian regime (Brown and Zasloff 1998 p.vii). During their ruling 
between 1975 and 1978, before ousted by Vietnam forces, over one million, 
maybe as many as up to two million, people died (Chandler 1996 p.212, UD 2007 
p.4). This was a direct result of the Khmer Rouge ruling which included 
overworking the people, not treating the sick in an appropriate way, giving too 
little food to the population and executions of people identified as enemies to the 
regime (Chandler 1996 p.212). When the Khmer Rouge was put out of office they 
waged a guerilla war against the government set up by Vietnam. The situation was 
further complicated by the Russian support to the Vietnamese forces and the 
Chinese support to the Khmer Rouge.  
By the end of the Cold War the five permanent members of the Security 
Council finally convened peace negotiations with the factions of the Cambodian 
conflict (Dobbins et al 2005 p.69). On 23 October 1991 the Framework for a 
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, the Paris Agree-
ment, was signed in Paris. There were four major factions that were supposed to 
live up to the agreement: the State of Cambodia (SOC) and the Cambodian 
Peoples Party (CPP), which was the governing party, the United National Front 
for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), 
the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), or the Khmer Rouge, and the Khmer 
People’s Liberation Front (Ibid. p.74). The four factions arose during the transi-
tional period the Supreme National Council (SNC) (Ibid. p.77).   
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3.1.1 The Mandate of UNTAC 
The Security Council Resolution 745 of 1992 established UNTAC on 28 February 
1992 to ensure the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The agreement gave 
UNTAC a mandate to deal with human rights, elections, military and police 
functions, civil administration, rehabilitation and the repatriation of refugees and 
displaced persons (Paris Agreement). More specifically UNTAC was to organize 
free and fair elections (Paris Agreement Annex 1) which were to be held no later 
than May 1993 (S/RES/745). The civil administration component was meant to 
supervise and control foreign affairs, national defense, public security, finance and 
information, which were agencies that could affect the outcome of the elections 
(Paris Agreement Annex 1). As part of the military and police functions UNTAC 
had to ensure law and order, supervise, monitor and verify the with-drawal of 
foreign forces and the ceasefire. UNTAC was also supposed to conduct 70% 
demobilization of the national factions (Paris Agreement Annex 1). At the same 
time the SNC was the “unique legitimate body and source of authority in 
Cambodia in which, throughout the transitional period, national sovereignty and 
unity are enshrined, and which represents Cambodia externally” (Paris Agreement 
para. 7). In March 1992 UNTAC was in place in Cambodia and could start its 
work.   
3.1.2 The Work of UNTAC 
UNTAC started its work in several areas at the same time. It established a training 
program in human rights and cleared 4 million square meters of mines. An 
electoral law was also submitted to the SNC.  The PDK at first did not want to 
comply but after pressure from the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG), the highest ranking UN staff, the law was finally adopted 
(UNTAC). The cooperation of the factions of SNC was a reappearing problem 
and UNTAC was caught up in a situation where it was to exercise control over an 
already existing sovereign bureaucracy. This got more complicated due to the 
resistance of the oversight from the government. For example the Cambodian 
officials created parallel structures for communication to avoid being monitored 
by UNTAC (Dobbins et al 2005 p.83).  
When it came to the cantonment, disarming and demobilization UNTAC 
failed because they could not get the PDK to cooperate. According to the Khmer 
Rouge foreign military personnel were still present in the country and they would 
thus not comply with the demobilization and the process had to be suspended 
(UNTAC). However, the Security Council decided that elections should be held 
no later than May 1993 (S/RES/783) and thus the focus became to be even more 
on the realization of the elections.  
Despite all the problems UNTAC managed to organize the elections in seven 
months. But, during the run-up to the election the security situation deteriorated. 
In some areas polling could not be conducted. 176 deaths, 316 injuries and 67 
abductions were reported, something that both the CPP regime and the Khmer 
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Rouge were responsible for (Paris 2004 p.85). Nevertheless, 89.56% of the 
population participated in the general elections in May 1993 (UNTAC).  A 
Constituent Assembly was also elected with a 3-month mandate to create the 
constitution and thereafter transform itself into the parliament.  
When the election result was released the CPP would at first not accept it 
since they had lost the power to FUNCINPEC. A compromise was reached re-
sulting in two Prime Ministers, one from FUNCINPEC and one from CPP. Never-
theless, in practice the leader of the CPP, Hun Sen, had the power since he had 
control over the civil administration and the armed forces (Paris 2004 p.86). 
UNTAC was however declared a success and was withdrawn (S/RES/880). The 
democracy in Cambodia was short lived though. The situation deteriorated after 
UNTAC had left and in 1997 Hun Sen took the power through a bloody coup 
(Dobbins et al 2005 p.86). 
3.1.3 UNTAC and the Liberalization Model 
As shown UNTAC was not, especially not in practice, the bureaucracy itself but 
was rather to monitor somewhat already existing structures. Thus it did not 
participate in institution building to any extent. When UNTAC failed with both 
the monitoring process and the demobilization the main focus became to conduct 
free and fair elections as to create a liberal democracy. This was done in only 
seven months. The emphasis on elections, no institution building, human rights 
and the short amount of time that UNTAC was deployed are together thus a good 
example of the quick liberalization model. Another example is that the elections 
were held before a constitution was in place.  
The coup shows that this model, at least in this particular case, did not work. 
Instead liberalization lead to some of the pathologies mentioned before. The 
elections became a harmful competition between CPP and FUNCINPEC when 
one of the parties at first did not accept the result of the election. Also, Hun Sen 
can be seen as a saboteur of the Cambodian transition to democracy. He and his 
party participated in the elections but, when the result did not turn out as he ex-
pected he performed a coup. 
Before comparing this, somewhat poor result, with the situation in Timor-
Leste after an IBL operation, a briefing of Timor-Leste and UNTAET is necessa-
ry. 
3.2 Timor-Leste 
The eastern part of the island of Timor was colonized by Portugal in 1701 and 
remained in its power until 1975. During the independence process political 
parties were established and Fretilin, a socialistic party that advocated indepen-
dence rather than incorporation with Indonesia, gained the most popularity 
(Säkerhetspolitik). Following the independence Indonesia invaded the country 
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(Dobbins et al 2005 p.151).  The first years of the occupation were brutal, the 
Indonesian military committed many atrocities and Falintil, the military wing of 
Fretilin, was practically defeated. By the 1980s between 100 000 and 200 000 
people had died due to the occupation (UD 2006 p.2). The international 
community finally started to show its interest in the conflict during the 1990s. In 
consultations between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN it was decided that the 
Timor-Leste should hold a referendum to decide its future. The popular consul-
tation was conducted by United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) which 
was given a mandate from 11 June to 30 September 1999 (see S/RES/1246, 
S/RES/1257). On 30 August 1999 78.5% of a 98% turnout voted in favor of 
independence (Chopra 2002 p. 982). Within two hours after the result had been 
announced the brutal response from the Indonesian National Military (TNI) and 
supportive militia groups came. Around 1500 people were killed (Säkerhets-
politik). 250 000 people were deported to West Timor while another 200 000 fled 
to the mountains (Dunn 2003 p.358). To put these number into context it has to be 
remembered that the total population of Timor-Leste is around one million (UI 
2006b p.43). Also, 74% of the buildings and houses all over Timor-Leste were 
destroyed (Dunn 2003 p.354). After negotiations with the UN Indonesia accepted 
the presence of a multinational force, INTERFET, which was given its mandate 
by the Security Council (see S/RES/1264).  Finally on 19 October Indonesia 
accepted the result of the referendum which made it possible for UNTAET to take 
over the responsibility of Timor-Leste. This also included the security responsibi-
lity formerly performed by INTERFET (Säkerhetspolitik).  
3.2.1 The Mandate of UNTAET 
UNTAET was established through Security Council resolution 1272 of 1999. The 
resolution gave UNTAET “overall responsibility for the administration of East 
Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, 
including the administration of justice” (S/RES/1272). More specifically 
UNTAET was supposed to: 
  
• Provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of 
East  Timor 
• Establish an effective administration 
• Assist in the development of civil and social services 
• Ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
rehabilitation and development assistance 
• Support capacity-building for self-government 
• Assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development 
(Ibid.). 
 
UNTAET was also given authorization to take all necessary measures to fulfill the 
mandate. As Jarat Chopra puts it, ”This project assumed a state-centric terra 
nullius and an open season on institutional invention.” (Chopra 2002 p.981). The 
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first regulation showed proof of this. It gave all legislative and executive power, 
including the judiciary administration, to UNTAET and the Transitional Admini-
strator, SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello (Regulation 1999/1). 
3.2.2 The work of UNTAET 
UNTAET “actually was the government through May 20 2002” (Dobbins et al 
2005 p.158). This was done by organizing UNTAET under three pillars: military, 
humanitarian assistance and governance and public administration (GPA) (Smith 
2003 pp.62-63). To keep a close connection to the Timorese people one of the 
first things UNTAET did was to establish an advisory body, the National 
Consultative Council (NCC), composed by both UNTAET staff and Timorese 
(Regulation 1999/2). After the UNTAET was criticized for not sharing power the 
NCC was transformed into the National Council (NC) with a somewhat more 
extensive mandate (Smith 2004 p.149). The GPA was also transformed into The 
East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) to increase the “timorization” and 
to reach a “fully functional civil service managed entirely by East Timorese.” 
(UNTAET Fact sheets No.12).  
In 2001 UNTAET organized the elections of a Constituent Assembly. Parties 
that had not been in favor of the independence were not allowed to participate 
(Smith 2004 p.150). UNTAET also established a Constitutional Commission that 
held hearings with the citizens to ask their view on the constitution (Ibid. p.149). 
The Constituent Assembly was elected on 30 August 2001 and on March 22 the 
task of creating a constitution was completed. According to the constitution the 
Assembly was to become the country’s parliament upon independence (UNTAET 
Fact Sheets No. 4). Following the elections of the Constituent Assembly the East 
Timor Public Administration (ETPA) consisting of ten ministries and four 
secretariats under the control of the Transitional Administrator was created. By 
the end of its presence UNTAET had recruited almost 11 000 domestic civil 
servants (Dobbins et al 2005 p.169).   
Continuing along the line of institution building an East Timor Police Service 
(ETPS) and as a part of that a Police Election Unit was established (UNTAET 
Fact Sheets No.6). Also, the East Timor Defense Force (ETDF) was built from 
scratch with the first battalion existing of previous Falintil members (Smith 2003 
pp.79-82). A Public Prosecution Service was also created (UNTAET Fact Sheets 
No.7). Moreover a nationwide radio channel, a TV channel and a newspaper were 
set up (UNTAET Fact Sheets No.19).   
Another step that was taken to meet the criticism of not letting the Timorese 
participate in the rebuilding process was to prepare for elections (Dobbins et al 
2005 pp168-169). Presidential elections were held on 14 April 2002. The elec-
tions were free and fair and no one contested the result of the Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC), another body created by the UNTAET. By 20 May 
2002 Timor-Leste gained its independence and UNTAET withdrew only to be 
replaced by United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) that 
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would continue to support the new state until 20 May 2005 (see S/RES/1410, 
S/RES/1480, S/RES/1543).  
3.2.3 UNTAET and the IBL Model 
UNTAET with its focus on institution building is a good representative for the 
IBL model even though not completely following Paris’ theory. It created a civil 
administration, a police force, a defense force, a public prosecution service, an 
independent electoral commission to oversee the elections and contributed to the 
origination of the constitution. Good civil society was promoted through the 
participation of civil society groups in the NCC and the hearings of the citizens 
before drafting the constitution. This might also have been done by not letting 
groups/parties that were opposing the independence (bad civil society) participate 
in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The establishment and control over 
media gave UNTAET a possibility to control hate speech.  
Since the independence no parliamentary election has been held- the 
Constituent Assembly has taken that role until the elections in 2007. It is therefore 
hard to say anything about the electoral system. Paris argues that the importance 
when it comes to the electoral system is “rules that compel serious candidates to 
secure significant political support across different communal groups.” (2004 
p.194).  The election to the Constituent Assembly was based on both regional 
representation and a nation wide proportional representation system which made it 
possible for different communal groups to be represented. Thus there were some 
moderating elements. The presidential election was based on a majority vote and 
there were no specific moderating elements. The major faction opposing the 
independence, Indonesia, was not present by the time of elections though and thus 
the need for moderating elements might therefore not have been that strong. 
When it comes to ripe conditions for elections it seems like the criteria of 
political parties not contesting the elections was fulfilled since this did not 
happen. Instead there was a major consensus among most parties that Xanana 
Gusmão should become the president (Smith 2004 p.154). Also, the absence of 
Indonesia and TNI might have played its part. As for the other criteria for ripe 
conditions, governmental institutions that can resolve election disputes and 
enforce its outcome, the IEC was established. Also, the ETPS had a special 
election unit. On the other hand the judicial system was not fully developed. 
There was for example no Supreme Court. But, the UN has continued its support 
to Timor-Leste since the independence, and thus it seems to recognize that the 
holding of elections is not the quick fix that will leave the state completely func-
tioning.  
The economic reforms have mostly been implemented by others than the 
UNTAET, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the 
International Monetary Fond (IMF) (Dobbins et al 2005 pp. 172-175). There was 
of course a close cooperation between the different agencies but the main respons-
ibility was not with UNTAET. It is therefore difficult to say something about 
UNTAET’s work when it comes to conflict-reducing economic policies. Some-
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thing worth mentioning is that the World Bank in its Transitional Support Strategy 
wanted to prioritize institution building and avoid complex projects until these 
institutions were in place (World Bank 2000 p. 13). This is thus a way to delay 
economic reforms until the political conditions have stabilized.  
Even though UNTAET does not fulfill all the criteria of the IBL model its 
institutionalization focus is strong enough to make it a representative case. 
Especially compared to UNTAC this is true. Therefore it is valid to use UNTAET 
and UNTAC to make this comparison. 
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4 Comparison of the Two Countries 
I have in the previous chapter shown how UNTAC and UNTAET distinguish 
themselves and how they represent the two different types of models. If Paris’ 
theory about institutionalization is true, Timor-Leste would be a greater success 
story by managing the post operation period better than Cambodia. This 
comparison is a very difficult one to make because depending on what parameters 
are used the result might turn out differently. As mentioned earlier the ultimate 
goal for both models has been to create a liberal democracy and how well they 
have accomplished this must therefore be the common point of comparison. The 
parameters listed in the methodology passage, the presence of violence, the 
elections, the human rights, and the level of economy and development, will here 
be used to determine this. 
4.1 Presence of Violence 
As mentioned earlier, the CPP at first did not recognize the result of the 1993 
elections in Cambodia. FUNCINPEC was later convinced by the CPP to include 
them in a coalition government. This was done by using the influence that Hun 
Sen and the CPP still had over security forces, the army and the civil administra-
tion. The harassments continued and escalated in a bloody coup in 1997 where 
Hun Sen took the power (Dobbins et al 2005 p.86, Freedom House 2002). 41 
political killings followed the coup (Freedom House 2002). Since then the 
violence has continued. There were for example 22 political murders reported 
during the two months prior to the 1998 election (McCargo 2005 p. 100, Freedom 
House 2002). Also, before the local polls in 2002, a “violent campaign that 
included several election-related killings, threats, vandalism, and other acts of 
intimidation against the opposition” took place (Freedom House 2003).  
In Timor-Leste armed attacks, have occurred since the departure of UNTAET.  
There were for example riots in Dili on 4 December 2002 where several buildings 
were destroyed. An attack on the town of Atsabe where five people were killed 
was reported and there were also indications that new bases for the former militia 
and other armed groups were set up (S/2003/243). During the spring of 2006 the 
security situation in Timor-Leste deteriorated. Around 600 soldiers, almost half of 
the army, were fired because they went on strike due to low salaries and discrimi-
nation. Parts of the police force took the side of the fired soldiers and gangs of 
unemployed youth also joined in. The escalation of violence resulted in tens of 
thousands people fleeing and buildings set on fire. The riots were put down, in a 
brutally manner, by forces loyal to the Prime Minister (Economist 2006, Hellberg 
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2006). In May 2006 21 people were killed and at this point 150 000 people were 
estimated to be found in temporary camps due to the disturbances. This lead to the 
deployment of a 3200 strong international peacekeeping force (TT 2006). Also, 
the run-up to the first round of presidential elections in 2007 has been somewhat 
violent and in February peacekeepers killed two men in a camp for displaced 
people (Economist 2007).  
According to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
covering the years from 2002-2005 Cambodia has a slightly better ranking when it 
comes to political stability and no violence which is defined as “the perceptions of 
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconsti-
tutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism” (World 
Bank 2006). This statistic does not cover the coup in Cambodia or the violence 
that erupted in 2006 in Timor-Leste.   
As part of the presence of violence it is also possible to look at the rule of law 
since this might show the willingness of the population to live by the law and also 
the possibility to deal with eruptions of violence. Timor-Leste ranks twice as well 
as Cambodia in 2004 and 2005, meanwhile during 2000, 2002 and 2003 
Cambodia’s ranking is slightly better (World Bank 2006).  
4.1.1 Assessment of the Presence of Violence  
In Cambodia there has been and is a presence of violence, especially around 
election times. The coup in 1997 is of course the most serious event. On the other 
hand the civil war has not resumed. In Timor-Leste there have been several inci-
dents, especially during the last year, where violence has been used. This has 
severely destabilized the country. None of these cases have come near a coup 
though. Another difference is that in Cambodia most of the violence is related to 
the state and the governing party while in Timor-Leste most attacks have come 
from different armed groups, with the state sometimes using violence as a 
response. The state being the main perpetrator is a serious threat to the liberal 
democracy since it is supposed to be the ultimate representative of these values. 
By using violence against its people it contradicts liberal democracy. On the other 
hand, citizens resuming to violence is of course also a sign of a not too well func-
tioning democracy since this might be an evidence of a growing frustration among 
the population that can not be channeled in any other way.  
The state being the perpetrator might also explain why Cambodia has a higher 
WGI ranking when it comes to political stability than Timor-Leste. When the state 
itself stands for a lot of the violence it might not destabilize itself but rather be 
strengthened. On the other hand, if IBL in the form of UNTAET had been 
working in the expected way, a stable state, through stable institutions, should 
have been the result.   
In both countries violence is present and it is difficult to decide where the situ-
ation is better or worse. During one period of time the level of violence is higher 
in one country and then it shifts. Looking at the most recent time period there 
seems to have been more violence in Timor-Leste. Comparing different incidents 
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though, no matter when they have occurred, the bloody coup in Cambodia is the 
most serious violent incident. Also, the rule of law is much higher in Timor-Leste 
than in Cambodia during the last years which shows that this is more deeply 
rooted among the population in Timor-Leste. The possibility to deal with violence 
also becomes much higher. The over all assessment must therefore be that Timor-
Leste over the time is somewhat better off when it comes to the presence of 
violence, even though the newest major incident seems to have occurred there. A 
thing that has to be kept in mind though is the support that the Timor-Leste still 
gets from the current UN operation which probably works as a stabilizing factor. 
How well Timor-Leste would be doing without that presence is impossible to say.  
4.2 Elections 
According to several sources the 1998 elections in Cambodia was neither free nor 
fair since there were restrictions on media and campaigning and, as mentioned 
before, a lot of political violence. Also, the CPP manipulated the rules on how to 
allocate the seats in the parliament (Dobbins et al 2005 p.86, Freedom House 
2002). The restricted access to media and violence as intimidation was also 
present in the 2003 parliamentary elections (Freedom House 2004). Duncan 
McCargo writes that “Elections in Hun Sen’s Cambodia have become an exercise 
in political theater that the CPP uses to legitimize its power.” (2005 p.100). The 
2002 presidential election in Timor-Leste on the other hand was conducted under 
free and fair conditions (Smith 2004 p.155). The first round of the presidential 
elections held on 9 April 2007 was also conducted in a peaceful and open manner 
according to the preliminary report of the European Union Election Observation 
Mission (EU EOM 1 p.1). The conditions improved during the second round even 
though there were some reports of intimidation and vote buying (EU EOM 2 pp.6-
7). 
Freedom House categorizes the world’s states as electoral democracies or not. 
An electoral democracy is a state that has a competitive multi-party political 
system, universal suffrage for all adult citizens, regularly contested elections with 
ballot secrecy and no massive voter fraud, and media access and campaigning 
possibilities for the major political parties to reach the electorate (Freedom House 
2007a p.3). Timor-Leste qualifies as an electoral democracy while Cambodia does 
not (Freedom House 2007b). Also, the WGI gives Timor-Leste almost twice as 
high a ranking than Cambodia between 2000 and 2005 when it comes to voice and 
accountability which includes the possibility to select a government, freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media (World Bank 2006). This is 
thus a mix of the elections and freedoms and rights components.  
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4.2.1 Assessment of the Elections 
The evidence of Timor-Leste being more successful than Cambodia is much 
clearer when it comes to elections than the presence of violence. The elections and 
the period around the elections have run much more smoothly. Put is simply, the 
elections in Timor-Leste have been freer and fairer. Also here the comparison be-
tween the countries is somewhat difficult though since the starting positions for 
the countries were different. Both Cambodia and Timor-Leste were weak or failed 
states but in Cambodia there was a regime in place.  This regime has have time 
since the Vietnamese intervention to gain control over the civil administration and 
security forces and thus had the incentives to take the power when it did not win 
the elections in 1993. In Timor-Leste on the other hand there was no existing 
regime after Indonesia withdrew. And, the biggest independence faction, Fretilin, 
won most of the seats in the election to the Constituent Assembly, which since the 
independence has acted as the parliament. Also, In Timor-Leste the UN has 
continued its presence and support after the holding of the first presidential elec-
tion through new missions and is heavily involved in the 2007 elections, some-
thing that can affect the conduct. The latest operation, The United Nations 
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) is, with a current mandate until 26 
February 2008, giving support to the ongoing presidential and parliamentary elec-
toral processes among other things. (S/RES1704, S/RES/1745). Even though there 
might have been international observers during the elections in Cambodia, there 
was no mission with the explicit mandate to support them.  Nevertheless, dealing 
with tensions prior, during and after the elections and make sure that the pre-
conditions are the best possible when leaving should be a part of the plan for a 
peacebuilding mission, no matter the liberalization or IBL model. Especially when 
the main focus is the elections. Thus the differences between the countries before 
the missions were deployed might explain why the elections have gone better in 
Timor-Leste but it is not a reason strong enough to diminish the result of the work 
of UNTAET compared to UNTAC. A continued long time support should also not 
diminish UNTAET’s work since a long time presence, if it is necessary, is part of 
the IBL model. Thus a continued UN presence should only be seen as a part of the 
IBL strategy. 
4.3 Human Rights 
Freedom House identifies Cambodia as a not free country since 1994. Meanwhile, 
Timor-Leste since 1999 has been ranked as partly free (Freedom House 2007c). 
To be able to compare this, the definitions of partly free and not free are neces-
sary. A partial free state is 
  
“one in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil 
liberties. Partly Free states frequently suffer from an environment 
of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and 
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often a setting in which a single political party enjoys dominance 
despite the façade of limited pluralism. A Not Free country is 
one where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil 
liberties are widely and systematically denied.” (Freedom House 
2007a p.2). 
 
Thus according to this Timor-Leste is providing the basic freedoms and rights 
better than Cambodia even though both countries have serious problems. A 
similar assumption can be made by reading Amnesty International’s yearly 
reports. During 2005 there were restrictions on freedom of assembly, threats 
against the opposition and human rights defenders, curtailing of criticism of the 
government, forcible returns of Vietnamese refugees and a corrupt and weak legal 
system among other things in Cambodia (Amnesty 2006a). In Timor-Leste during 
the same period the justice system was weak, which lead to unlawful arrests and 
detentions, and there were some allegations of police abuses. The main focus 
though was on the impunity of the abuses connected to the 1999 referendum 
(Amnesty 2006b).  Looking at previous years the weak and corrupt legal system, 
the threats (sometimes assassinations) against the opposition and the treatment of 
the refugees as well as the political violence linked to the elections were reappear-
ing themes in Cambodia (see Amnesty 2005a, Amnesty 2004a, Amnesty 2003a).  
Also, in Timor-Leste the same breaches of the human rights, the weak legal 
system and police abuses, reappear in previous reports (see Amnesty 2005b, 
Amnesty 2004b, Amnesty 2003b). 
4.3.1 Assessment of the Human Rights 
In both countries breaches against the human rights are present and serious. Even 
though it might be somewhat strange to compare violations with one another, the 
violations in Cambodia seem to be somewhat worse. There are for example 
several more types of breaches in Cambodia than in Timor-Leste. Political killings 
or assassinations have been reported from Cambodia several times while in 
Timor-Leste there are no such reports during the period covered here. Especially 
around election time the breaches of the human rights are very serious in 
Cambodia while there are very few incidents reported so far from Timor-Leste. 
Timor-Leste’s main problem seems to be with a not too well functioning justice 
system and police force, something that of course is very serious and needs to be 
dealt with. This also cast some shadow on UNTAET’s work since they did create 
institutions but maybe not as well functioning as one could hope for.  
Also the difference in the human rights performance might be explained by 
the presence of the international community. In Cambodia there has not been 
another mission since UNTAC left and thus there has not been any strong verifi-
cation mechanism there to monitor how the regime is behaving. In Timor-Leste 
on the other hand the UN presence leaves less space for conducting breaches. 
How Timor-Leste would have done all by itself is impossible to say, maybe they 
too will have a worse human rights record when the international support leaves. 
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On the other hand the continued support to the institutions might give Timor-
Leste enough time to implement the human rights in all areas and make them the 
self-evident way of conduct. In that way the human rights becomes consolidated. 
UNTAET’s mode of operation has therefore worked better than UNTAC’s when 
it comes to the promotion of the human rights. 
4.4 Level of Economy and Development 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a combined index for measuring 
development. The parameters used are life expectancy, adult literacy and school 
enrolment, and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita calculated in pur-
chasing power parity (PPP) income (UNDP 2006). According to the HDI Timor-
Leste is ranked as 142nd in the world while Cambodia has a ranking of 129 
(Ibid.). Looking at each specific parameter the life expectancy in Timor-Leste is 
56 years, while it is 56.5 in Cambodia. The adult literacy rate reaches 58.6 % in 
Timor-Leste and 73.6% in Cambodia while the school enrolment ratio is 71.7% in 
Timor-Leste and 60.2% in Cambodia. The GDP per capita in Cambodia is 2 423 
U.S. dollars.  Since there are no numbers on the GDP per capita in Timor-Leste a 
national estimate of 1 033 U.S. dollars had to be used to calculate the HDI (Ibid.). 
The number from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs gives a somewhat 
different picture. According to them the GDP/capita in Cambodia was 317 U.S. 
dollars in 2005 (UI 2006a p.21). In Timor-Leste the GDP was 352 U.S. dollars per 
capita (UI 2006b p.51). Thus here the Timorese economy is slightly better, but 
these numbers does not seem to be PPP adjusted.  Moreover, the sources showing 
that the Cambodian GDP/capita is higher are several (CIA, UD 2006 p.1, UD 
2007 p.2).  
Other measures of the level of economy and development than the HDI can be 
used, especially when it comes to the economy.  An effective economy can for 
example be measured by looking at the level of corruption. The control of 
corruption is higher in Timor-Leste than in Cambodia according to the World 
Bank (World Bank 2006). Since it almost always is a market economy that is pro-
moted how well the government issues policies and regulations to promote the 
development of the private sector is also relevant. When it comes to this Cam-
bodia has around twice as good ranking as Timor-Leste (Ibid.). Gender equality 
and employment rate are other relevant measures. I have found no statistics on 
gender equality. The World Bank estimates that the unemployment rate is around 
20% in Timor-Leste reaching 43% among the youth in the urban areas (World 
Bank). I have found no statistics that can be compared here though. CIA estimates 
the unemployment rate to be 2.5% in Cambodia in the year 2000 and 50% in 
Timor-Leste in 2001 (CIA). These numbers are hard to compare since they are 
estimates and for different years. Since the difference is so big though it seems 
pretty safe to say that the unemployment is higher in Timor-Leste than in 
Cambodia.  
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4.4.1 Assessment of the Level of Economy and Development 
There is hardly any difference in the life expectancy age between the countries so 
this as a measure of how well the health system works shows no difference. The 
literacy rate is much higher in Cambodia than in Timor-Leste. On the other hand 
the school enrollment is higher in Timor-Leste which implies that the present 
school system is better in Timor-Leste. This might lead to a higher educational 
level in the long run. The big difference lies in the income per capita and unem-
ployment. This shows that Cambodia has a better economy than Timor-Leste 
when it comes to these areas, while corruption seems to be lower in Timor-Leste. 
The high unemployment rate in Timor-Leste has to be taken into certain consi-
deration since many people without work is a destabilizing factor that might lead 
to renewed violence. 
There is thus no uniform trend when it comes to the level of economy and 
development which makes it difficult to make a judgment of the result. Also, the 
statistics of development and economy are probably the least reliable ones of the 
parameters since they depend more heavily on the information from each govern-
ment than the other ones. More indicators would have been preferable. This is 
also the most difficult parameter to connect to the work of UNTAC and UNTAET 
since the work in the field of economy and development often is done through 
other agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF. Nevertheless, with an over 
all evaluation, the economy in Cambodia seems to be somewhat stronger while 
the development in other aspects is more or less the same. 
Here the time aspect has to be taken into account. A longer time has passed 
after the conflict in Cambodia than in Timor-Leste and thus they have had a 
greater opportunity to develop the economy. Cambodia has also become popular 
for tourism which of course brings in revenue. Another difference that might 
affect the economic development is the size of the population. In Timor-Leste the 
population is just above one million (UD 2006 p.1) while it is over 13 million in 
Cambodia (UD 2007 p.1). This means that the labor force is much bigger in 
Cambodia than in Timor-Leste which might make Cambodia more attractive for 
foreign investors. The textile industry has for example been developed in Cam-
bodia. Timor- Leste might be seen as a too small economy to be worth investing 
in.  
4.5 Alternative Explanatory Factors 
 I have already mentioned that other circumstances than the operations themselves 
might have affected the outcome. For example the continued international 
presence in Timor-Leste might explain the different results. On the other hand the 
good effects of the international presence only speak in favor of the IBL model 
since this means that the international community has shown interest for a long 
term commitment and not a quick fix model. The time difference and the political 
situation before the missions were deployed might also have had an effect on the 
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present situation. The time difference would have spoken in favor of Cambodia 
though. 
Other explanatory factors, not mentioned before, are the scope of the conflict 
and the presence of violent factions. The Khmer Rouge regime is counted for as 
very brutal and an estimated two million people might have died during their 
ruling. In Timor-Leste that number was no more than 200 000, which of course 
also is a high number. This must nevertheless be compared to the size of the popu-
lation. In Cambodia almost a fourth of the population died (UD 2007 p.4). In 
Timor-Leste the number is lower, around a fifth of the population died. On the 
other hand over 70% of the infrastructure in Timor-Leste was destroyed. Thus 
these differences might not be as big as it first seems. A difference that is more 
evident though is the presence of violent factions. In Timor-Leste, the most 
violent faction, the TNI, withdrew when UNTAET deployed, leaving some minor 
militia groups behind. In Cambodia on the other hand the Khmer Rouge continued 
its presence. But, it was not the Khmer Rouge that put a halt to the democratic 
process. Instead it was the party who acted as a government during a large part of 
the conflict, the CPP, which was responsible for the coup. The Hun Sen regime 
also seems to be responsible for a lot of the human rights violations.  
These other explanatory factors have of course affected the present situation in 
the respective countries. However, they do not seem to be strong enough to falsify 
the findings that the UNTAET’s work has affected the present situation in Timor-
Leste in a more positive way than UNTAC has in Cambodia in three out of the 
four points of comparison.   
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5 Conclusion 
To decide which of the two countries that come closest to a liberal democracy it is 
necessary to combine the four parameters. When it comes to the presence of 
violence the result is not obvious. Both countries have had eruptions of violence 
after the peacebuilding missions left. Even though the most recent violence seems 
to have erupted in Timor-Leste the most serious events have occurred in Cam-
bodia. Therefore, taking into consideration the bloody coup in Cambodia and the 
serious violence around elections time, Timor-Leste is somewhat closer to the 
ideal goal of a functioning liberal democracy. This is also true when it comes to 
the elections and the human rights. There has been very little political violence 
and frauds in Timor-Leste whereas intimidations of different kinds frequently 
have occurred in Cambodia around election time. The elections have therefore 
been freer and fairer in Timor-Leste. When it comes to the human rights the 
breaches have been fewer and less severe in Timor-Leste. On the other hand, the 
economy seems to be working better in Cambodia. Thus in three out of the four 
parameters Timor-Leste has come closer to the goal of a liberal democracy during 
a shorter amount of time. Even if one does not give the parameters the same 
weight, the economy can not be said to be more important than the other three 
combined.  
Other circumstances such as the time difference, a continued international pre-
sence in Timor-Leste, the scope of the conflict and the presence of hostile factions 
have affected the present situation. However, when looking at these differences 
they do not seem to be big enough to falsify the findings of Timor-Leste being 
closer to a liberal democracy than Cambodia. Thus the over all assessment must 
be that Timor-Leste is closer to the goal of a working liberal democracy even 
though there still seems to be severe problems there.  
The question to be answered in this thesis was whether the focus on institu-
tionalization increases the prospects of peacebuilding missions succeeding. In 
three out of the four parameters used in this thesis Timor-Leste comes closer to 
the ideal goal of a liberal democracy. Therefore, institutionalization seems to 
increase the prospects of success for the peacebuilding missions since success 
throughout this thesis has been defined as how well the operations have created 
favorable conditions for a liberal democracy.     
By using the operations in Cambodia and Timor-Leste, the IBL model shows 
to be more effective when it comes to creating a liberal democracy. Comparing 
two cases is of course a too narrow study to make any general assumptions about 
peacebuilding. More operations using the IBL strategy are necessary. Also, the 
findings are limited since there has been no possibility to conduct any field 
studies. Furthermore, using other parameters as points of comparison might have 
given a different result. As will be shown in the final chapter, there are also some 
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problems with the IBL model itself since one can hardy claim that Timor- Leste is 
a fully working liberal democracy. Nevertheless, in the setting that this thesis has 
been written the question of institutionalization increasing the prospects of peace-
building missions succeeding seems to be true when comparing it to the liberaliza-
tion model.  
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6 Final Reflection- Problems with IBL 
If the result from previous chapter is accepted, the IBL model would be preferable 
to the quick liberalization model. Accepting the IBL is not that easy though. It is 
obvious that Timor-Leste still has a lot of problems and has a long way to go 
before becoming a working liberal democracy. There are human rights violations, 
eruptions of violence and the economy does not seem to work. The eruptions of 
violence might in one way be the most serious one since this shows that a large 
part of the population is unsatisfied with their possibility to affect their own lives. 
The reason for this might actually be the two other problem areas; the bad 
economy which leaves many people unemployed and the violations of the human 
rights which shows that the rule of law is not consolidated. Also the weaknesses 
in both the justice system and the police force affect the situation. All this shows 
that the IBL model might also have some problems when it comes to creating a 
stable peace through a liberal democracy.  
The supporter of the IBL model could explain the recent situation in Timor-
Leste by claiming that UNTAET did not follow the IBL model closely enough. 
UNTAET did create institutions before elections but maybe not as good as were 
necessary. The quality of the institutions has to be taken into account. As 
mentioned before, both the police force and the justice system are still not 
working smoothly. The courts are weak and the election process is dependent on 
the UN. Another sign of this is high unemployment rate which shows that the 
economic polices have not worked that well. They have created a fragile situation 
rather than stability so far. The institutionalization might thus have been rushed 
too much, leaving UNTAET closer to the liberalization model than it was 
supposed to. After all, it only operated for two and a half years. This leads us to 
the problem with IBL though. Rushing the institutionalization and the election 
process seems to have been a result of increasing the timorization of the operation. 
After all, UNTAET was criticized for not sharing power.  As Jarat Chopra puts it 
“there is never a vacuum as long as there is a population. There is a profound 
difference between anarchy defined as the absence of a national executive, 
legislature and judiciary, and the actual breakdown of indigenous social 
structures.” (Chopra 2002 p.981). The participation of the population2 is therefore 
fundamental but something that seems to be difficult to implement in the IBL 
model. 
One of the strengths of the IBL model is that it dares to put off 
democratization in a first phase. But, this is also one of its weaknesses. The way 
that IBL was conducted in Timor-Leste gave the Transitional Administrator and 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 For a discussion about participatory intervention see Chopra 2002. 
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Administration a very extensive power thus leaving very little room for opposition 
to their ideas and decisions. Therefore, put into practice the IBL seems to show 
too little consideration to the local settings and the incorporation of the local 
population. There is a risk for a top down approach, which might be seen as too 
interventionalistic. The West ones more arrives with a prefixed model and ideas 
without thinking about how this will work in a different cultural and historical 
setting. The whole process of building and democratizing a country might then be 
rejected and actually create more tensions leading to renewed conflict. Thus when 
criticizing the quick liberalization model for creating pathologies Paris forgot the 
participatory element of the local population (or the absence of it) being one thing 
affecting the success of peacebuilding. This meant that he did not include this in 
the IBL model with the risk of also making this model fail.  
Institutionalization in itself might not be the wrong way to go when it comes 
to peacebuilding but the risk of leaving the local population on the side has to be 
dealt with. The starting point for all peacebuilding missions, no matter what 
model one finally decides to use, should therefore be to consult the population 
already from the start not only on the question of independence but also on how 
they want their country to be run. In that way the whole process would be deeper 
rooted in the country and the risk of renewed tensions might decrease. How to 
increase the participation of the local population in the IBL model is thus 
something that is necessary to discuss and develop if this model is to increase the 
prospects of peacebuilding mission success.  
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